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In the first (German) edition of The Logic of 
Scientific Discovery (1934), Popper expressed the view 
that a truth concept was an unnecessary element in his 
philosophy of science. Thus, he wrote, "in the logic 
of science here outlined it is possible to avoid using 
the concepts 'true' or 'false'. Their place may be 
taken by logical considerations about derivability re-
lations." 1 But by the time of the publication of the 
English edition of this work (1959), Popper affirms 
that he is "no longer hesitant in speaking of 'truth' 
and 'falsity.'" 2 Finally, by the time of Conjectures 
and Refutations 1 (1965) he characterizes science as a 
"search for truth."* 
Clearly, a change in attitude is evidenced here 
with regard to Popper's views on the truth question. 
The present paper explores the reasons for, and impli-
cations of, this change. It does not, however, attempt 
an "archaeology" of the development of Popper's views 
on this issue. Rather, focusing mainly on the essays 
collected in Conjectures and Refutations, it uncovers 
the rationale for Popper's eventual endorsement of a 
truth concept, and examines the elements in, and impli-
cations of, the truth concept he endorses. 
On the basis of this survey of Popper's position on 
the truth question, the argument is developed that, 
while the introduction of an objective theory of truth 
is necessary to support Popper's realist position, the 
absolute character of his truth concept conflicts with 
other central tenets of his philosophy, especially with 
his endeavor to specify criteria of progress toward the 
truth. The result is that the introduction of a truth 
concept also introduces inconsistencies into the Pop-
perian system. A satisfactory way of reconciling these 
inconsistencies, which to date have remained insuffi-
ciently explored, has yet to be devised. 
Rationale 
As is frequently the case with his commentators, I 
have thus far referred to Popper's truth concept in the 
singular (and for convenience, I shall continue to do 
so throughout the paper). Yet it is important to re-
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call at the outset that the truth concept In question 
is a complex one. In fact it contains at least three 
distinct elements: (1) a correspondence conception of 
absolute truth, modeled after Tarski; (2) a notion of 
degrees of truth; and (3) the concept of verisimili-
tude, a quantitative measure of truth. As will emerge 
more clearly as we proceed, all of these elements play 
an important and distinct role in the Popperian frame-
work, and accordingly, it is not permissible (as some 
commentators tend to do) either to refer to them inter-
changeably or to equate Popper's truth concept with his 
account of verisimilitude. Indeed, my argument in 
large part is that, while each of the above components 
is required by some aspect of Popper's philosophy, 
their attempted integration within a single framework 
tends to destabilize the overall system. 
In the successive sections of this paper, each of 
these components will be commented on in some detail. 
At this point, however, I focus on the reasons why Pop-
per eventually moved to include a truth concept in his 
philosophy. And in using the term 'truth concept' in 
this context, I shall be referring primarily to its ab-
solute (correspondence) element. 
A first consideration in this regard is whether any 
special difficulties stand in Popper's way here. Did 
Popper have anything to lose, as it were, by changing 
his mind on the truth question? 
According to the early text. Popper's own answer to 
this question is in the negative; he was of the opinion 
that no "particular difficulty" would be encountered 
were he to incorporate a truth concept; he omitted one 
simply because he considered it unnecessary to his po-
sition (LScD, 274-76). Later on, however, Popper does 
acknowledge that certain long-standing epistemological 
difficulties pertaining to the correspondence theory 
contributed to his decision to do without it. 
Reflecting on the matter, it is not difficult to 
discern reasons for Popper's reluctance in this regard. 
For in addition to traditional objections to the cor-
respondence theory as such. Popper's philosophy pre-
vents him from appealing to frameworks which would most 
readily seem to accomodate such a conception of truth. 
The general and long-standing objections to the 
correspondence theory are fairly well known. They in-
clude the fact that it is difficult (unsympathetic 
critics say impossible) to define satisfactorily the 
nature of the correspondence at issue or to explain 
what it is that is held to correspond. Still further 
problems are encountered if one attempts to answer 
these kinds of questions with regard to universal, neg-
ative, or counterfactual propositions.* It must be ad-
mitted, however, that these kinds of difficulties have 
not, on the whole, prevented a good number of philoso-
phers, including contemporary philosophers of science, 
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from incorporating a correspondence theory in their po-
sitions. 
For Popper, however, there is the additional prob-
lem that his revolutionary stand on theories as conjec-
tures and on science as a problem-solving activity pre-
clude his appeal to frameworks in which such a con-
ception of truth seems most readily at home. Thus, for 
example, it is clear that Popper cannot invoke the 
verificationist claim that the gradual accumulation of 
observations provides evidential justification for our 
(true) knowledge claims. Nor can he, as a rationale 
for introducing his truth concept, appeal to a view of 
science as an axiomatised deductive system, since he 
rejects this view as well in favor of a problem-solving 
approach, in which scientific knowledge grows as we 
test our conjectures and learn from our mistakes.' 
Why then should Popper "bother" to incorporate a 
correspondence conception of truth? Given the excluded 
alternatives, what rationale can he offer for so doing? 
Essentially, the answer to these questions centers 
on (1) Popper's defense of realism, his "third view" of 
knowledge, 7 the merits of which he argues over both es-
sentialism and instrumentalism; and on (2) his third 
requirement for the growth of knowledge, that is, the 
requirement that acceptable theories should pass some 
new and severe tests. In both cases, as we shall now 
see, a truth concept is needed to provide a standard of 
success, of scientific progress or growth. 
The extent of Popper's realism can perhaps be most 
easily seen by contrast with his radical critique of 
scientific instrumentalism. On the instrumentalist 
view, theories are neither true nor false; they are 
simply computational devices for the prediction of ob-
servational phenomena.* Popper attacks the instrumen-
talist view on both a polemical and a methodological 
level. On the polemical level, he castigates instru-
mentalism (and to an extent also pragmatism, as he un-
derstands it), in its concern for the merely useful, as 
"glorified plumbing," "incompatible with the apprecia-
tion of science as one of the greatest achievements of 
the human spirit" (CR, 102, 103). More importantly, on 
the methodological le\fel Popper argues that the skills 
and procedures involved in trying out computational in-
struments and attempting to determine the limits of 
their applicability are very different from those in-
volved in the testing of (genuine) theories (CR, 111). 
More specifically. Popper objects that "theories in so 
far as they are instruments cannot be refuted," at 
best, only the limits of their applicability (as in-
struments) can be ascertained (CR, 113). Hence, in-
strumentalism does not meet the central requirement of 
Popper's philosophy—that "theories are tested by at-
tempts to refute them"; for similar reasons, instrumen-
talism makes nonsense of the idea of "crucial experi-
ments" (CR, 112). Again, because it does not abide by 
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the canons of progress through (attempted) refutations, 
and because it does not concern itself with testing the 
more remote implications of theories. Popper condemns 
instrumental!sm as "obscurantist," and as leading more 
towards complacency and stagnation than towards new 
scientific discovery and growth (CR, 113-14). 
By comparison, Popper takes a favorable view of es-
sentialism which maintains, inter alia, that scientists 
aim at finding true theories or descriptions of the 
world, and at formulating true explanations of observa-
ble facts (CR, 114). In Popper's view, however, essen-
tialism must give way to realism because the former 
(unlike the latter) also maintains that scientists ac-
tually can succeed in establishing the truth of theo-
ries, and that successful scientific theories describe 
the "essences" or "essential natures" of things. In 
contrast. Popper's own position is that it can never be 
conclusively established that a theory is true, al-
though it may be established (with "reasonable cer-
tainty") that a theory is false. That is to say, while 
scientific theories as conjectures are indeed "serious 
attempts to discover the truth" (through severe criti-
cal testing), they are not verifiable, i.e., capable of 
being shown to be true (CR, 115). 
From this, it becomes clear that, if theories are 
not to be regarded merely as useful computational de-
vices, a truth concept (standard) is required to gauge 
the extent of genuine growth in scientific knowledge. 
This becomes still more apparent in Popper's account of 
(the necessity for) his "third requirement" for the 
growth of knowledge. 
It will be recalled that the major desideratum of 
the third requirement—which goes beyond the first two 
requirements of simplicity and testability--is that 
theories should pass some new, and severe, tests (CR, 
242). This means that a theory, to be successful, must 
lead to the prediction of phenomena that have not so 
far been observed (CR, 241), and it must simultaneously 
succeed in "resisting at least some of our most deter-
mined attempts to refute it" (CR, 245). This require-
ment is needed, Popper argues, to eliminate trival or 
ad hoc theories, which either may be based on post 
facto analysis and description of the data, or may 
yield predictions which turn out, on testing, to be im-
mediately falsified. As just noted, the third require-
ment seeks to prevent the first situation from arising 
by requiring new predictions; it seeks to prevent the 
second situation by demanding that, despite severe 
testing, theories not be too quickly refuted.* In 
short, then, the third requirement seeks to ensure the 
growth of knowledge by ensuring that successive theo-
ries will be "better" than their predecessors. 
The idea of truth enters the picture here as a 
methodological underpinning for the third requirement. 
The basic idea in this regard is that only a true the-
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ory (or one that is at least truer than its predeces-
sors) is likely to yield successful (new) predictions 
in the long run, and thus to withstand severe testing 
in a productive manner. Popper claims furthermore that 
this thesis is central to his notions of both verisim-
ilitude and crucial experiments (cf. CR, 246-47). And, 
although this point is not explicitly made by Popper, 
it might be added that (as others have pointed out) un-
less the truth of a theory is allowed, whatever predic-
tive success it may enjoy remains something of an inex-
plicable accident. 1 9 Correlatively, without the idea 
of truth, Popper's realism degenerates into a kind of 
instrumentalism, and likewise, one could have no firm 
hope regarding the "enforceability" of the third re-
quirement. It is the methodological justification of 
these elements in Popper's position that constitutes 
the rationale for his introduction of the idea of 
truth. 
Having once introduced a truth concept, however, 
Popper requires (or is compelled to do so by the logic 
of his position) that it performs other functions in 
addition to those just described. This, as I shall ar-
gue in the remainder of the paper, places a considera-
ble strain on his truth concept, and ultimately, on the 
consistency of his position as a whole. To pursue this 
argument, however, it is necessary to examine in fur-
ther detail the nature of Popper's truth conception. 
Nature 
Absolute Truth 
As was noted at the outset, a primary character-
istic of Popper's truth concept is that it attempts to 
appropriate Tarski's definition of truth as its foun-
dation. 1 1 To be compatible with the requirement dis-
cussed in the preceding section, Popper requires "a 
correspondence theory of absolute and objective truth" 
(CR, 223). As was also noted above--and as is in any 
case clear from the structure of Popper's philosophy— 
the requisite theory cannot, however, be verficationist 
or "subjectivist" in intent. As Popper affirms at some 
length (CR, 223-28), he believes that in the Tarskian 
conception he has found a truth theory that both bypas-
ses traditonal objections and satisfies the specific 
(nonverificationist) constraints of his own position. 
It remains to consider whether Popper's truth concept 
does in fact succeed in these regards. 1 2 
As is well known, in the course of developing his 
semantic conception of truth, Tarski establishes the 
condition that the sentence "snow is white" is true if, 
and only if, snow is white (or more generally, the con-
dition that X is true if, and only if, p ) . Of course, 
it is this ("disquotation") aspect of the Tarskian for-
mulation that Popper - finds particularly attractive. 
138 
For as Popper understands it, the Tarskian thesis es-
tablishes both (1) the correspondence of an idea with 
the facts, and (2) the notion that "a theory may be 
true even though nobody believes it, and even though we 
have no reason for accepting it, or for believing that 
it is . true" (CR, 223-25). That is to say, Popper be-
lieves that he can extract from the Tarskian formula-
tion the required correspondence theory of absolute and 
objective truth in a manner which does not appeal to 
any verificationist justification. It is, however, 
highly questionable whether the Tarskian formulation 
can satisfy these conditions. 
To begin with, it is highly uncertain whether the 
truth concept that Tarski developed to resolve formal 
problems in semantic theory has any real application in 
the philosophical domain as such. In this regard, it 
is noteworthy that, while Tarski set out to formulate a 
definition which would "do justice to the intuitions 
which adhere to the classical Aristotelian conception 
of truth" (SCT, 343)—broadly, a correspondence concep-
tion of truth—he equally affirms that the formulation 
arrived at is epistemologically "neutral" (SCT, 362), 
and that, in particular, the semantic definition "im-
plies nothing regarding the conditions under which a 
sentence like 'snow is white' can be asserted" (SCT, 
361). These "global" considerations alone should cau-
tion us against too readily applying the semantic con-
ception of truth to the kinds of philosophical contexts 
that Popper intends. Coupled to this, however, there 
are more specific technical difficulties having to do 
(for example) with the possible applications of the 
Tarskian definition outside the domain of the purely 
formalized languages (which maintain, inter alia, a 
clear distinction between object and metalanguages) for 
which it was primarily intended. 
Even if we allow Popper the benefit of the doubt on 
the technical issues mentioned thus far, significant 
problems remain. The problems remain even if we also 
admit that the Tarskian formulation provides both an 
objective account of truth (at least in an intuitive 
sense) and also one which satisfies Popper's require-
ment that a theory may be true even though we have no 
reason for believing that it is true. Even if we allow 
all this, significant problems still remain. Most 
notable in this regard is the consideration that 
Popper, as he repeatedly affirms (see esp. CR, 223-28), 
requires a correspondence theory of truth (to satisfy 
his realism, etc.)--a theory, that is, which would do 
justice to "the peculiar relation of correspondence to 
a fact" (see, e.g., OK, 46). Yet close analysis of the 
Tarskian definition indicates that it does not, nor was 
it intended to, support the relation of correspondence 
between sentences and facts. 1 1 Keuth, in particular, 
has demonstrated that the Tarskian formulation could 
not support a correspondence relation without falling 
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into the kinds of semantical antimonies it was devel-
oped to resolve. 1* Accordingly, the conclusion can 
hardly be avoided that, while Popper's position re-
quires an objective, non-verificationist, correspon-
dence conception of truth, he has not in fact identi-
fied one which is adequate to the task. 
In a sense, however, the foregoing criticisms only 
represent the tip of the iceberg, so to speak, so far 
as Popper's truth concept is concerned. For, as has 
already been noted, the Tarskian element is but one 
component in Popper's truth concept. And, as we shall 
now see, each of the other components--the notions of 
degrees of truth and of verisimilitude—present very 
significant problems in their own right. Let us con-
sider first the introduction of the notion of degrees 
of truth in Popper's philosophy. 
Degrees of Truth 
For the purposes of the remainder of this paper, we 
may suppose that Tarski's definition does indeed pro-
vide the kind of support for Popper's (correspondence) 
truth concept that Popper himself believes it does. 
This strategy will allow us to discern more clearly how 
significant problems of another sort arise in the ap-
plications to which Popper subsequently puts his objec-
tive truth concept (on the assumption—incorrect, as we 
have just seen—that it does find adequate support in 
Tarski's definition). 
Specifically, new problems begin to surface as soon 
as we examine Popper's affirmation that, although there 
are no criteria of truth as such, there are indeed cri-
teria of progress toward the truth. 
Taken by itself, the first part of this claim (viz. 
that there are no criteria of truth) is relatively un-
problematic. Certainly, it does relegate Popper's (ob-
jective) truth definition to the status of a regulative 
ideal that can never be known to be attained in prac-
tice (CR, 226). But this is completely consistent with 
Popper^s non-verificationism. (Indeed, more generally, 
it is consistent with the fact that correspondence the-
orists rarely claim to be providing criteria of truth.) 
It is also consistent with Popper's attempt to hold 
open the (ongoing) reviseability of theories--in a man-
ner that does not commit one to holding as absolutely 
true (at one time) a theory which subsequently comes to 
be refuted as false (as has happened on more than one 
occasion in the history of science). Taken in conjunc-
tion with Popper's claims regarding criteria of pro-
gress toward the truth, however, the idea of absolute 
truth experiences a certain strain. 
The fundamental problem I am pointing to here is, 
of course, that of whether an absolute conception of 
truth (even when taken in a regulative sense) and a no-
tion of degrees of truth (or of progress toward the 
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truth) can be consistently accomodated within a single 
framework. More specifically, can the Tarskian defini-
tion on which Popper relies so completely also accomo-
date a notion of degrees of truth? 
This problem, it must be noted, occurs to Popper 
also. He acknowledges that to make sense of the idea 
of getting nearer to the truth (progress towards the 
truth), we would have to be able to speak of better 
(and worse) correspondence to the facts. And he goes 
on to ask, with reference to the Tarskian position in 
particular, "Can we really speak about better corres-
pondence? Are there such things as degrees of truth? 
Is it not dangerously misleading to talk as if Tarskian 
truth were located somewhere in a kind of metrical or 
at least topological space . . . ?" (CR, 232). Pop-
per'-s own answer to this question is a confident af-
firmation that we can indeed speak of better and worse 
correspondence to the facts, and that it is not mis-
leading to do so. I must admit, however, that I have 
considerable difficulty in accepting this conclusion. 
Briefly stated, my objections center on the fact 
that, as usually understood, the correspondence theory 
of truth entails the view that a sentence is true if, 
and only if, it corresponds to the facts; otherwise it 
is false; and it is difficult to see how this defini-
tion, which on both traditional 1* and Tarskian 1' inter-
pretations is held to support the laws of contradiction 
and of excluded middle, can be reconciled with a notion 
of degrees of truth. Within the Tarskian framework in 
particular, can we meaningfully say, for example, the 
sentence "snow is white" is partly true? I cannot see 
either this or Popper's own example ("snow is usually 
white") as viable within the Tarskian framework (CR, 
234). Perhaps some (more intuitive) version of the 
correspondence theory can accomodate the idea of better 
(or worse) correspondence with the facts, but it seems 
to me that it has yet to be demonstrated that the Tar-
skian definition can do so. Again, it is a Tarskian-
style interpretation of the correspondence theory that 
Popper, in fact, needs in view of his non-verifica-
tionism. 
It must be noted, however, that in attempting to 
demonstrate the plausibility of the idea of better cor-
respondence to the facts, Popper himself appeals most 
directly to the comparative verisimilitude of theories 
(CR, 232-33). Thus far, I have not focused on this as-
pect of Popper's attempt to justify his notion of de-
grees of truth because, for the reasons now to be con-
sidered, the notion of verisimilitude (although taken 
by some to be virtually synonymous with truth for Pop-
per) itself stands in a dubious relation to truth as 
such, and thus raises a new level of problems. 
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Verisimilitude 
Verisimilitude is intended to provide a quantita-
tive measure of progress toward the truth. From Pop-
per's point of view, it has the advantage of providing 
for a clearly-defined, non-instrumentalist assessment 
of theories, given that we cannot actually know them to 
be true. Overall, of course, it presupposes that good 
sense can be made of the notion of degrees of truth 
within the Popperian framework. But even if we suppose 
that better sense can be made of the latter notion than 
I have been prepared to allow, further significant dif-
ficulties emerge on closer examination of the concept 
of verisimilitude itself. 
Verisimilitude is defined by Popper as the truth-
content of a theory minus its falsity-content, and 
Popper indicates that it is especially helpful in the 
comparative assessment of theories. 1 7 Despite the ap-
pearance of quantitative exactitude, however, as a mea-
sure of truth, verisimilitude turns out to be a rather 
elusive concept. 
A first and major difficulty regarding its applica-
tion is that we cannot take an assessment of verisimil-
itude to be a measure of progress toward the truth un-
less we already know what is true (of course, according 
to Popper, we cannot know this). 1' Even if we succeed 
in obtaining a measure of the comparative verisimili-
tude of two theories using the Popperian definition— 
and this might not always be possible, especially in 
the case of false theories—we can by no means im-
mediately claim that the theory with higher verisimili-
tude is closer to the truth than the theory with lower 
verisimilitude; on subsequent testing, the former may 
still turn out to have many more false consequences 
than the latter—and hence, actually be further from 
the truth than the latter, this outcome being presently 
obscured perhaps by its relatively higher content (high 
content, it will be recalled, is encouraged by Popper's 
injuction in favor of bold conjectures). To repeat, 
for these and related reasons even a high degree of 
(comparative) verisimilitude cannot demonstrate that a 
theory is closer to the truth; to establish this, we 
would already need to know what was true. 
Noting this difficulty, Ackermann distinguishes be-
tween apparent and actual verisimilitude, and he con-
cludes that all we can know in practise is that we have 
increased (or decreased) the apparent (not actual) ver-
isimilitude of theories (Ackermann, 90, 93). But with 
this shift from actual to apparent verisimilitude, how-
ever, the notion becomes largely irrelevant as a meas-
ure of truth (or degrees of truth); it remains instead 
as a measure of corroboration; a measure simply of the 
content of theories, of how well they have survived the 
tests they have been subjected t o . " The (near) equa-
tion of verisimilitude with corroboration, it may be 
142 
noted, does not only have the effect of rendering the 
former dispensable as a measure of truth; in addition, 
it equates verisimilitude with another concept in Top-
per's philosophy (corroboration) that has in turn been 
criticized for its possible links with verificationism 
and inductivism (see, e.g., Ackermann, 93)--the very 
elements that Popper's complex truth concept was con-
structed to avoid. Paradoxically, then, it may be the 
case that far from resolving the truth enigma in 
Popper's philosophy, the notion of verisimilitude (if 
pushed to the limits) threatens the system with self-
contradiction . 
Summary and Conclusion 
The present paper has argued that, while in his 
early work Popper could dispense with a truth concept, 
his increasing emphasis on realism, and on the need for 
subjecting theories (conjectures) to new, and severe, 
tests, (eventually) necessitated his introduction of a 
notion of absolute and objective truth. However, the 
appeal to Tarski's semantic definition of truth, which 
Popper makes to avoid verificationism, cannot provide 
support for the kind of correspondence theory Popper 
requires. 
It has been argued further that the notion of de-
grees of truth (of better or worse correspondence to 
the facts), which Popper introduces to underpin the 
idea of the (comparative) progress of theories toward 
the truth, and to prevent his truth concept from becom-
ing a vacuous regulative principle, cannot easily be 
reconciled with the overall absolute and objective 
sense of truth that he endorses. 
Finally, it was argued that verisimilitude, Pop-
per's proposed quantitative measure of progress toward 
the truth, in fact measures, not truth, but corrobora-
tion. This not only renders verisimilitude dispensable 
as a measure of truth, but also, paradoxically, links 
it with one of the more verificationist aspects of Pop-
per's thinking. 
To date, these inconsistencies and tensions in 
Popper's position on truth have not been much commented 
on. Certainly, if they are resolvable, this has yet to 
be demonstrated. 
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derable elaboration and refinement. These possible 
refinements, however, do not significantly affect the 
types of criticism raised here. The criticisms of 
verisimilitude I offer here are based on those of Ayer, 
Ackermann, and O'Hear in particular. 
"Ackermann, pp. 90-91; cf. Ayer, pp. 690-91. 
"Cf. CR, 58, n. 24. Indeed, Popper himself notes 
in passing that "corroborability by empirical tests is 
the proper methodological counterpart to this new meta-
logical idea |viz. to verisimilitude!" (CR, 235); he 
does not, of course, draw the conclusion that verisim-
ilitude is not an effective measure of progress toward 
the truth. 
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